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Why is it so hard for the left to produce a coherent and progressive response to the crisis, when 
markets and private enterprise have so obviously failed? One answer is that the left faces a trilemma 
in public policy. It must respond adequately to the economic crisis to be seen as competent, it must 
address the established themes in public opinion to be electable, and it must develop generous and 
inclusive policies, to be progressive. 
This paper identiies conlicts in all three areas: low public sector productivity growth and 
demographic shifts tighten already harsh spending constraints. Entrenched public suspicions 
of higher taxes for any but the distant rich and a public discourse which makes rigid distinctions 
between those who are deserving and undeserving of state welfare conlict with egalitarian or 
redistributive policies. Both spending constraints and the key themes in public opinion conlict with 
generous and inclusive policies. The UK coalition strategy, by contrast, rests on private enterprise-
led recovery, work-ethic values and policies that exclude less deserving groups. It does not face the 
same problems. This paper analyses a range of policy programmes suggested by commentators 
and thinktanks on the left in the light of these points. It concludes that a progressive strategy must 
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A left trilemmaIntroduction: A left trilemma
The UK coalition government’s cuts from the 2010 emergency budget onwards can be looked at in 
two ways: on the one hand the 2010 programme and its extension in the 2011 autumn statement to 
2016-17, in view of weak economic performance, represents the largest and most precipitate cuts in 
public and in social spending at least since the “Geddes Axe” infamous drive for retrenchment in UK 
government expenditure in 1921-2.1 Various commentators argue that it will increase poverty2 and 
homelessness3, unfairly damage opportunities for women4 exert further pressures on the ‘squeezed 
middle’5, severely undermine the NHS6, erode public health provision and weaken child and elder 
care services.7
On the other hand, it is also true that the cut-backs simply return spending to a level close to the 
overall post-war trend level of slightly below 40% of GDP.8 Indeed, the sharpest departure from the 
post war trend was the 2001-10 increase to 47% under the then Labour government. Another way 
of looking at it is to point out that Labour plans in their May 2010 budget accepted cut-backs to 
stabilise public spending but limited their extent, applied them more gradually and recouped more 
of the deicit through taxation.9 The UK Coalition’s 2010 plan simply takes spending levels (though 
not the distribution of spending) to where they would have been under Labour’s 2007-8 plans by 
2010-11, but does so four years later.10
Both these viewpoints are compelling. The recession and sluggish growth cost the UK at least 6% of 
GDP between 2007 and 2011, compared with what might have been achieved if the previous trajectory 
had continued. On the Oice of Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) November 2011 projections, growth 
will not return to 2007 levels until 2016-7.11 By then, output will be some 13% below what had been 
predicted in 2006.12 The response to the recession cost real money in spending on unemployed 
people, bailouts and ‘quantitative easing.’13 Any political economy plans must accommodate the 
dual pressures of fewer resources and extra spending. This implies measures to stimulate growth, 
cuts in public spending and increases in taxation.
The problem of adequacy under these circumstances can speedily be made more onerous by 
including three further considerations: demographic pressures, low state sector productivity 
growth and rising inequalities. A fourth concern, the cost of managing climate change is omitted 
from this discussion.14
Long-term demographic pressures
The OBR Fiscal Sustainability Report15 attempts to project future government spending and 
revenues over a ifty-year period. Such projections are subject to considerable uncertainty, since 
it is impossible to predict growth, interest rates, economic and productivity growth, migration 
and other factors with certainty. A number of diferent scenarios under difering assumptions are 
developed. The basic inding is that ‘public inances are likely to come under pressure over the 
longer term, principally as a result of an ageing population..Government would have to spend 
more… on…pensions and healthcare. But the same demographic trends would leave government 
revenue roughly stable.’16 The central (and optimistic) assumption (Figure 1) shows that the 8% 
gap between spending and revenue in 2010-11 is removed by 2020-1 as a result of stringent cuts 
that bring spending as a proportion of GDP to 1998 levels, assuming a return to pre-crisis growth. 
Spending then returns to long-term trend levels and the balance deteriorates, with a gap of 0.6% of 















 5   |  A left trilemma: Progressive public policy in the age of austerity |  Peter Taylor-Gooby  |  March 2012 www.policy-network.net
1. Economic pressures: current challenges and future prooing
Figure 1: OBR Central long-term projection: Spending, revenue and the balance (%GDP)
Three points should be noted. Firstly, the report generally assumes current UK Coalition government 
plans will be realised, except that short-term beneits will be uprated by earnings rather than CPI, 
the latter being the current policy. Maintaining CPI uprating would cut spending by about 1.6% by 
2030-1, with further cumulative savings.18 This would resolve the problems of the spending gap, 
at severe cost to very poor people, by reducing beneits for those of working age by about 14% 
compared with general inlation and nearly three times that compared with projected earnings.19
Low state sector productivity growth
Secondly, the projections assume real improvements in productivity across the public sector in line 
with those in the rest of the economy. If such improvements are not achieved and public sector 
workers do not have their pay cut compared to others (perhaps through privatisations), the real 
cost of maintaining standards in the public sector, and the proportion of GDP it absorbs, rises.20 
Productivity is hard to measure in the public sector, mainly because outputs include qualitative as 
well as quantitative aspects (for example the dignity with which patients are treated as well as the 
mortality rate). Improvements have proved very hard to achieve.21 NHS productivity has luctuated 
between 1996 and 2009, with a very slight net fall, mainly due to increases in the drugs bill and staf 
pay.22 For education, productivity also luctuated, mainly due to changes in the school population, 
but it has shown no overall improvement.23 More recently eforts to improve productivity have 
redoubled. A drive to generate 4.4% annual savings between 2010 and 2015 for reinvestment and to 
meet spending pressures has so far achieved cost-eiciencies at about half that rate, half of which 
are not permanent.24
The NHS is probably a particularly di cult area in which to achieve cost-eiciencies because 
standards are so politically salient, high-skilled staf are needed and other costs such as drugs 
and medical technology may also rise. An alternative possibility analysed by OBR considers NHS 
productivity rising at 1% below the whole economy. This would require a further 1.7% of GDP to 
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These points make clear that there is considerable uncertainty in the public spending predictions, 
but that real pressures are likely to continue beyond the current period of austerity. Adjustments 
to spending in such areas as pensions, bus passes, fuel allowances and military procurement, 
and to revenue in energy taxes, vehicle duties, inheritance and capital taxes are possible.25 The 
problems which are likely to emerge over a half-century are not insuperable. However, a progressive 
programme, which does not envisage the kind of cuts in living standards for working age claimers 
and state sector workers with which the current government implicitly plans to balance the books, 
and which expects to achieve real improvements in healthcare and elsewhere, must respond to 
these pressures.
One further point: current policies involve a profound restructuring of public provision which 
requires extra upfront spending and additional longer-term commitments.26 Would it be possible to 
square the triangle of rising demand, diminished resources and weakened capacity to meet needs 
by directing cut-backs diferently? The Government provides estimates in relation to NHS reform 
of £1.7bn (rejected by the HoC Health Committee, 2011, para 92, who suggest a igure closer to 
£3bn, see also Walshe 2010). The Universal Credit reforms are estimated at £3bn by OBR and the 
student loan system at 30% of loans written of, or about £3bn at current prices.27 In the irst two 
cases, the plans simply assume that restructuring will deliver NHS eiciency savings faster than 
ever before and that beneit reforms will increase employment. For student loans, spending will 
not be recouped within the 30 year time-horizon examined, and possibly never. However, these 
sums amount to less than 0.3% of public spending annually over the period. They are unhelpful, but 
abandoning the plans would not resolve the problem.
Rising inequalities 
Society has grown more unequal during the last three decades. The distribution of incomes and 
wealth seems likely to fan out further. The modest post-war trend towards greater equality of 
opportunity may well be in reverse.28 These points matter, because greater inequality appears to 
reduce willingness to support social provision, because of the impact on interests and on social 
values: those who hold the majority of resources are better able to meet their own needs privately 
and have less interest in provision for the poor29; inequality undermines collective solidarity and 
public trust in state institutions.30 Progressive social policies will have more to do, with lower public 
support.
A helpful analysis distinguishes between the trend to greater fanning-out of incomes for the mass 
of the population (as better-of groups improve their position relative to the median, while that of 
lower-income groups deteriorates) from the tendency of small very rich minorities to gain large 
relative improvements.31 The irst trend seems to apply to most developed countries during the past 
three decades. The latter is more a feature of the Anglo-Saxon world, most notably of the US and 
the UK.32 Public policy in the UK appears to have arrested the deterioration of the relative position 
of those at the bottom during the early and mid-2000s (Hills et al. 2009, 28). How easy it will be to 
pursue similar strategies in the future is unclear.
Overall the general tenor of debate is that there are likely to be real but not insuperable additional 
costs to maintaining welfare standards, even when stable growth returns. Current estimates of 
those costs are, if anything, on the low side. This raises the bar for any attempts to develop a more 
progressive policy approach than that pursued by government. Satisfactory policies must avoid the 
damage of the current cuts, which bear very heavily on those least able to cope. They must take 
into account the real resource losses outlined in the irst paragraph. They must set a course that 
will meet needs in the longer term at least as well as they are met at present, and do so in a way 
that accommodates the shift to greater inequality. They cannot rely on assumptions about sharp 
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There are at least three further criteria for progressive policies.33 First, any reform programme must 
mobilise support from voters. The recent debate between those who believe Labour in 2010 may 
have alienated traditional working-class voters34 and those who stress the importance of retaining 
middle class support strengthens this concern.35 Secondly, an electable programme needs to relect 
at least some of the main directions in public opinion and also must it within the parameters 
of discourse established by the UK media and by opinion-leaders. Thirdly, it must be capable of 
development in a way that leads public opinion in a progressive direction. Here that is understood 
as inclusive and generous.
Traditional vs. aspirational Labour voters
Middle-class Labour voters are often seen as more aspirational and concerned with greater 
opportunities, while the core working-class values basic public services and policies to address 
inequalities, but at the same time endorses work ethic distinctions between deserving and 
undeserving groups. New Labour succeeded in attracting votes from both middle-class and working-
class people from 1997. In 2010 support declined among most social groups. One interpretation of 
election polls by current Labour party leader Ed Miliband supports the view that the loss of support 
was most marked among semi and unskilled working class voters.36 Prominent commentators refer 
to statistics from Ipsos-Mori which shows a striking collapse of support among the groups most 
likely to vote Labour in 2005: an 11% fall among C2s and 8% among the semi and unskilled DE core 
working class group.37 
However, these statistics are generated by amalgamating all Ipsos-Mori polls taken during the six-
week campaign period to produce a combined sample of 10,000 (Table 1).They may relect events 
at diferent stages in the campaign, the changing contexts in which questions were asked and the 
problems of mixing and reweighting poll data. It is noteworthy than a second Ipsos-Mori poll taken 
after the election and given in alternate columns of Table 1 in italics, shows a diferent picture: the 
collapse in Labour support was about half that estimated in the widely-quoted combined polls 
among the DE group and more evenly spread across middle-class AB and C1 groups. Labour voters 
in the C2 group are often the focus of concerns about how well Labour appeals to ‘aspiring’ people 
on lower to middle incomes. Support among this group fell by only 1% as against the 11% shown in 
the earlier combined surveys.
Table 1: Ipsos-Mori combined re-election and post-election poll statistics*








AB 39(+2) 40 (+3) 26 (-2) 23 (-5) 29 (0) 31 (+2)
C1 39 (+2) 40 (+3) 28 (-4) 28 (-4) 24 (+1) 28 (+5)
C2 37 (+4) 25 (-8) 29 (-11) 39 (-1) 22 (+3) 28 (+9)
DE 31 (+6) 29 (+4) 40 (-8) 42 (-6) 17 (-1) 22 (+4)
The poll igures are not conclusive, but indicate that concerns about alienating either middle or 
working-class Labour supporters may be misplaced. This is conirmed in the available analyses 
of the academic 2010 British Election Survey: those in the ‘working class’(supervisors and manual 
occupations) were slightly more likely to vote Labour … the decline [between 2005 and 2010] was 
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*Note: 
(1) Change since 2005 in brackets 
(2) Pre-election combined 
amalgamates allIpsos-Mori polls 
between 19.3.10





(3)Post-election: 12-13th May 




2. Further constraints: Electability and the promise of social progress
Compatibility with public discourse
Quantitative and qualitative attitude studies and analyses of media discourse point to ive general 
patterns in public opinion:
 First, some groups and some service areas are more highly valued than others.39 There appear to 
be two main dimensions to this division, between mass and minority provision (the NHS, pensions 
and education vs. working age beneits and social housing) and, of particular importance, between 
provision for deserving as against undeserving groups, favouring those who are not responsible for 
their dependence on beneits (children, disabled people) or those with demonstrable commitment 
to a work or family ethic.40 
 Secondly, reciprocity emerges as a theme in much analysis, favouring as deserving those who are 
seen to make a contribution in return for entitlement.41 
Thirdly, there is support for redistribution from rich to worse of, but it diminishes as the threshold 
of wealth is brought closer to average incomes.42 
Fourthly, most people fail to make any link between the capacity of government to inance public 
spending and the tax that they and others pay. When pressed they tend to suggest that eiciency 
savings can reconcile better services with lower taxes.43
Fifthly, poverty is consistently understood in absolute and minimal rather than relative terms.44 
In addition to these ive directions identiied in attitude surveys, a sixth current in ideas is also 
relevant. This is to do with a growing sense of disillusionment with or distrust of the state and the 
public sector.45 It emerges in the growing political disengagement termed ‘anti-politics’.46 
These points indicate di culties in promoting an inclusive and generous programme. They also 
imply real opportunities. The fourth point makes it hard to address inequalities as opposed to basic 
need, and the irst is particularly powerful in limiting the scope of progressive policy. The second and 
third constrain the capacity to raise revenues and to redistribute, leading to a policy bias towards 
cut-backs that is strengthened by concerns about the deicit. The ifth creates further di culties in 
marshalling support for progressive change.
The opportunities lie in the possibility that notions of desert may be expanded to cover a broad 
range of needs (point one), that the possible linkage of entitlement to contribution legitimates 
contribution-based policies (point two) and that growing inequalities may strengthen the appeal of 
redistribution (point three). The task of developing policies to cope with continuing pressures will 
be easier if basic trust in government returns (point six).
The uncertainty over election polls adds to these concerns. The more commentators emphasize a 
distinctive collapse of core working class support, the more they are inclined to place weight on the 
issues of desert (point one) and of tax resistance (point three).
Leading in a progressive direction
As well as gaining public acceptance, progressive policies must help lead the way people understand 
welfare towards more inclusive and generous provision. Inclusiveness relates to the identiication of 
net recipients and net givers and to reciprocity between them. A strong tradition in social psychology 
and sociology stresses the power of in-group and out-group cleavages.47 To overcome these 
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recognition of the needs and capacities of others. Complementary work in social anthropology48, 
political science49, decision theory50 and social policy51 demonstrates the importance of reciprocity 
in social relationships. This may strengthen links between those able to help each other, but conirm 
divisions between those engaged and those deined as non-contributors.
Generosity concerns recognition of need and willingness to address it. Analysis of opinion surveys 
and media discourse indicates a shift in the established pattern of greater generosity in hard times 
occurring about 2007-8. Figure 2 shows that for most of the 1990s and early 2000s agreement with 
the statement that ‘beneits for unemployed people are too low and cause hardship’ from British 
Social Attitudes surveys, and media references to ‘scroungers’ tended to mirror unemployment 
rates. Higher unemployment was associated with greater concern about beneit levels and 
fewer references to scroungers. However the tendency to greater punitiveness across the period 
of declining unemployment appears to continue as unemployment starts to rise after 2007. The 
suggestion that public sympathy for poor minorities is fading is supported by a recent YouGov survey 
for Prospect magazine: ‘74% of people think that Britain spends too much on welfare and should cut 
beneits’.52 Whether the apparent shift is simply an attitudinal lag or indicates a secular change in 
attitudes is currently unclear. If it is the former, public opinion may move slowly to accept greater 
redistribution, as unemployment rises and poverty increases. If the latter, the currentcampaign to 
label claimers as undeserving will have produced a real shift in attitudes, creating further problems 
for progressives.
Figure 2: Unemployment as % labour force (WEO Harmonised rates), Media Discourse (Nexis) 
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* BSA Question: ‘Which of these 
two statements comes closest 
to your own view … beneits for 
unemployed people are too low 
and cause hardship, OR beneits 
for unemployed people are too 
high and discourage them from 
inding jobs?’ Data is % choosing 
the irst option
Media Discourse is measured as 
the number of mentions each year 
in UK National Newspapers of the 
word ‘scroungers’ (divided by 100).
Current proposals for progressive reform may conveniently be divided between those that operate 
at a macro level, directed at reform of the economic system or the social structure as a whole, and 
micro-level reforms, concerned with improving the lives of individual citizens.
Macro-level
At the macro-level the main themes are to do with slowing or deferring cutbacks to maintain the 
level of demand, expanding infrastructure spending, especially on environmentally friendly projects 
and tax reform. All the programmes that include a macro-economic element mention these themes 
with diferent degrees of emphasis.53 The underlying concern is to create the conditions for real 
growth. The UK Coalition government argues that private enterprise will generate growth provided 
intervention is limited. Progressives follow Keynes in pointing to a major role for the state during 
the downswing of the economic cycle, although they difer on the extent of intervention during an 
upswing.54
The “Plan B” presented by the pressure group Compass probably puts the strongest emphasis on 
the importance of maintaining demand, followed by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 
with reports such as “10 ways to promote growth”, but the theme also emerges in recent pamphlets 
including “Red Labour”, “Purple Labour” and “What Next for Labour”.55  All these programmes include 
a substantial state investment bank with a bias towards environmentally-friendly projects in such 
areas as energy generation, public transport and home insulation, and towards projects that boost 
employment. The Compass “Plan B” again develops the case most strongly with estimates of the 
return on such investments and details of the environmental case. The brief Policy Network pamphlet 
“In the Black Labour” expresses the greatest concerns about how commitments on public spending 
will damage electoral perceptions of iscal responsibility, but supports infrastructural spending.55
“Plan B” also argues for international inancial regulation and management of banking and a tax 
on inancial transactions. It provides a detailed account of income and wealth inequalities and 
argues for more progressive taxation and plans for a gradual redistribution of wealth. Many of the 
programmes also stress the importance of making the tax system more progressive but this is not 
generally worked out in detail. The Glasgow Media Group estimates that a 20% tax on the wealth of 
the top 10% would raise some £800bn and be suicient to pay of the national debt.56 It points to 
80% support for such a measure in a YouGov poll, relecting public endorsement of redistribution 
from the distant rich. The plan is briely stated and does not consider the obstacles to levying such a 
tax, the extent to which it would involve retrospective changes to legislation in relation to pensions, 
trusts and other areas and might inluence the behaviour of potential payers.
Micro-level
At the micro-level the range of initiatives is greater. Five major themes may be identiied in the 
debate: social spending as social investment; building social solidarity; responding to the deserving/
undeserving distinction; the importance of engaging users directly in service provision; and the 
logic of pre-distribution as against redistribution.
Social investment
The clearest and most developed argument for social investment is contained in IPPR work on 
returns from child care.57 This shows a possible return of £20,000 over four years for each women 
returning to work after one year’s maternity leave, reducing to £5,000 when income igures are 
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3. Current centre-left proposals 
return is impressive. Plan B refers generally to social investment, giving the uncosted examples of 
obesity reduction and other behavioural changes to reduce pressures on the NHS.58 The returns on 
investment, for example in improvements to the quality of social housing or in public health, are 
often difuse, long-term and dependent on factors outside the state sector. Previous research shows 
that the most impressive returns on social sphere investment are found in education59, but that it is 
more di cult to establish a clear picture in other areas.
Building solidarity
A substantial Fabian Society stream of work on the factors that have contributed to successful 
redistributive and integrative welfare in the UK, drawing on historical analysis, cross-national 
comparison and attitude surveys, concludes that welfare policies must be inclusive if they are to 
succeed in meeting the needs of the poor.60 Highly-targeted provision typically fails to enlist the 
support of the mass of the population and leads to a downward spiral of increasing restriction and 
exclusion. This work entitled “The Solidarity Society” seeks to reconcile commitment to universalism 
with the realities of deserving/undeserving distinctions through a welfare system that incorporates 
as many groups as practicably possible. It proposes a range of measures, including a combined 
housing beneit that incorporates subsidies to all tenure groups and reduces the divisions between 
them; a merged tax-allowance-and-beneit system which efectively uses tax-allowance credits to 
support-lower paid groups; a self-conscious basing of beneit entitlement for working age claimers 
on social participation; and real sanctions for claimers who refuse to engage in activities that make 
a social contribution.
The objective is to ensure that the welfare state includes citizens and does so by reinforcing 
relationships of reciprocity rather than moralistic divisions or individual interest. One problem lies 
in ensuring that all groups can engage in activities that will be realistically understood by most 
people as making a social contribution. The Fabian Society research indicates that full-time caring 
for children or frail elderly or sick and disabled relatives, full-time studying for useful qualiications 
and some kinds of full-time voluntary activity are recognised in this way. These activities would form 
the basis of an inclusive welfare state.
Responding to social divisions
An alternative response to public opinion is to seek to devise policies that work with existing 
divisions. This is attractive to those who believe that the Labour party became detached from 
traditional working class roots during the early 2000s.61 The resulting logic of ‘something-for-
something’ welfare is designed to link the notions of reciprocity and inclusiveness to the theme of 
desert.62 Social contribution justiies the receipt of beneit. Many proposals centre on the idea of 
social insurance, a theme which has had some success in protecting welfare systems in corporatist 
European countries.63 
This approach is attractive in many ways. One problem is illustrated by the National Salary Insurance 
scheme proposed by James Purnell, a former UK Labour secretary of state for work and pensions, 
which is often seen as a key example.64 This scheme allows those whose employment is interrupted 
by illness or redundancy to claim a relatively high beneit which will then be recouped through a 
supplement to tax when they return to work. This is essentially a loan system underwritten by the 
state rather than a beneit or insurance. As analysis by the social policy academic Ben Baumberg 
points out, the approach is of limited application.65 It cannot address the needs of those who have a 
weak employment record, who face extended periods of unemployment or who are low-paid and 
unable to inance their own beneits. In short, it entrenches a deserving/undeserving distinction 
among claimants, the issue that recognition of a wider range of socially-desirable activities seeks to 
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User engagement
User engagement emerges in a range of ideas from co-production, where services users are actively 
involved in providing, managing and sometimes inancing the services they use, through to the 
expansion of mutual and co-operatives. The Compass “Plan B” draws heavily on the work of the 
New Economics Foundation in its discussion of co-production.66 Current work in this area has 
applied the idea with some success in health and social care.67 How it would be extended to other 
areas, especially those involving substantial professional inputs or cash transfers, is not worked out 
in detail. Co-operatives are discussed in a number of the essays in the Progress collection “Purple 
Labour”. Provider co-operatives would operate to stabilise irms and to moderate pay inequalities, 
a theme that has recently been taken up by mainstream politicians.68 Co-operatives that included 
users in the areas of social care for example, might lead to more responsive services and a stronger 
trust in social provision. If co-operatives succeed in engaging the public, they may help to rebuild 
trust in the state that will facilitate further progressive reform.
The co-operative approach ofers a management model for such areas, but can only address issues 
of inclusion if speciically designed to facilitate entry by outsiders. Mutuals which provided services 
or support for members might be subject to all the in-group biases identiied by social psychologists, 
anthropologists and sociologists and be unwilling to extend the service to new members who did 
not have demonstrable resources to contribute. This requires careful attention to how co-operatives 
recruit members and interact with outsiders.
Pre-distribution
The grand tradition of state welfare has rested on redistribution through taxation of the better of 
or of individuals at life-cycle stages when income exceeds resources, to provide welfare when they 
are in need. Pre-distribution addresses inequalities at source, through state interventions into the 
operation of market systems to reduce income inequalities and shift power towards the lower-
paid. The most powerful arguments for this approach rest on the claim that state welfare was most 
successful in the UK when the institutions to reinforce pre-distribution were at their strongest, in 
the 1950s and 1960s.69 The American scholar Jacob Hacker points out that the massive increase in 
inequality in some of the most developed countries is associated with erosion of the protective 
institutional framework.70
Pre-distribution might include institutional changes, such as a strengthening of the bargaining 
position and inluence of workers through stronger trade union rights and representation on works 
councils, legislative interventions such as enforcement of higher minimum wages or a living wage, 
better working conditions or shorter working hours, measures to curb wages at the top end through 
reforms to remuneration systems and possibly maximum wage legislation and interventions to 
control the prices of items of common consumption such as utilities, transport or food.
This approach is attractive for three reasons: it addresses the issue of redistributing power towards 
groups that have grown relatively weaker in the market; it increases the inluence of institutions that 
might reinforce solidarity and promote greater reciprocity across groups that may then perceive 
a stronger common interest; and implementation costs are low. The problems are to do with the 
impact on the structure of social relationships and on market interactions. Some of the proposals 
are directed to strengthen the bargaining power of organised labour, while some are directed 
to those at the margin of or outside work. At various times these groups have failed to recognise 
common interest and much of the tradition of a deserving/undeserving distinction derives from this 
division. One contribution is to direct interventions to investments that increase the supply of jobs 
while strengthening the protection of wages and standards in those jobs, the reverse of the current 
spending cut plus Work Programme strategy. At minimum, pre-distribution needs to engage with 
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Pre-distribution confronts the operation of the capitalist market system directly and may afect 
international competitiveness. This leads to concerns about how well an approach which developed 
during the heyday of nation state capitalism is itted to advance collective interests in a more 
globalised world.71 This takes the argument in the direction of the greater cross-national regulation 
of inequalities stressed by “Plan B” in order to ensure that competitive pressures do not damage a 
high-wage economy. 
This brief overview of progressive strategies indicates areas of consensus and of conlict. Consensus 
is found at the macro-level in relation to a stronger role for the state in moderating the economic 
cycle and in economic investment to secure growth. Damage to Labour’s reputation for economic 
prudence may constrain willingness to spend. At the micro-level, disagreements are more marked 
and focus on issues of balance between diferent policies. This is particularly evident in two areas: 
irst between policies which direct their eforts to working with the deserving/ undeserving 
distinction (expanded notions of contribution, social insurance-based logics) as against those which 
seek to side-step it (pre-distribution, social investment); and secondly between those which stress 
the engagement of ordinary people (co-production, mutuals and co-operatives) as against those 
which rest on top-down initiatives (child-care spending, progressive tax, better social housing). 
Social investment and pre-distribution are strongly supported.
           
The above discussion identiied three main criteria for progressive policies. They must enable 
government to address the immediate budgetary challenges, they must be consonant with public 
opinion and be electable and must lead discourse in a progressive direction. It also pointed out that 
they must acknowledge the issue of continuing economic pressures, the productivity constraints 
public services face and the degree of social inequality that exists.
Macro-level
There is a considerable measure of agreement at the macro-level on the themes of infrastructural 
spending to encourage growth and of more progressive taxation. The Coalition government 
introduced a modest £6.3bn infrastructure package in the 2011 Autumn Statement, with the 
expectation of some £5bn in the longer term and a possible £20bn leveraged from private sector 
pension funds. IFS calls for a further £10bn and NIESR suggests £15bn. Compass proposes a much 
larger programme, with a £100bn fund for the Investment Bank.72 Tax reforms are also not described 
in detail but include new taxes directed at the reduction of income and wealth inequalities. Similar 
ideas are included in most programmes.
It is unclear how far these policies would be more successful than current government initiatives in 
addressing the immediate problems of sluggish growth, mainly because developments in the UK 
are intertwined with those elsewhere. Apart for the arguments of “In the Black Labour”, there is little 
work examining in detail how spending plans would relate to budgetary constraints. If we assume 
that these constraints are, at least in the short-term, severe, it is necessary to identify areas for 
cut-back.
Non-welfare state areas, especially defence, face sharp cuts, which could continue. A generous and 
inclusive policy would seek to spread the savings burden more evenly. IFS analysis suggests that 
the cuts and tax changes bear most on those at the bottom and on a small group at the top, facing 
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4. Coming to terms with the public policy trilemma
on the distant wealthy (a capital value or land tax, perhaps or higher inheritance taxes) would it with 
public discourse. One problem is how far it is possible to bring higher taxes down the income 
distribution, given public resistance to taxing the middle class. A further issue concerns the desire 
to mitigate beneit cuts. Some resources could be saved in the short-term by terminating the 
restructuring of beneits and public services. It is di cult to see how far further savings could be 
made without addressing state pensions. This would afect a large group in the electorate typically 
seen as deserving.
These considerations imply that new policies at the micro-level are essential if the macro-level 
problems are to be addressed. These policies must at least constrain spending. They must also it 
with public opinion and build the public trust necessary to support future progressive reforms.
Micro-level
Social investment is attractive because it ofers a return, so that net spending commitments are 
contained; areas like child-care it the public opinion constraint because they focus on an obviously 
deserving need group (young children) and are directed at supporting paid work. They also help 
support an inclusive solidarism since they can be universal across the group. For these reasons they 
have been vigorously promoted by progressives in Europe.74 However the case for investment is 
only persuasive in a limited range of areas, mainly around education and public health.
Solidarity policies based on principles such as contribution can operate across a wider range of areas, 
provided that the public will accept a relatively broad range of activities and not simply a social 
insurance payment or paid work as a relevant contribution. Spending commitments may generate 
problems, since inclusion is likely to involve extra spending on higher beneits for those who are 
unable to make equivalent cash contributions. The deservingness barrier creates di culties in 
including people, typically from the most deprived groups, who are unable to make any contribution. 
The Fabian work on “The Solidarity Society” addresses this by postulating activities which might 
enhance future contributions such as attendance on training and work-readiness programmes for 
unemployed people. Beneit entitlement for those unwilling to accept these requirements would 
be reduced. The policies ofer a progressive contribution because they build reciprocity and help 
channel debates towards the idea that citizens contribute and derive beneit from participating in 
society.
Policies which operate within the constraints of the deserving/undeserving distinction, such as 
National Salary Insurance, are likely to be inancially viable, since their range is relatively small. They 
are electorally feasible and attractive to public opinion, but do not build inclusiveness.
User engagement programmes can use a wide range of techniques, involve little extra spending, 
are often attractive to a public which feels ignored by remote decision-makers, and may help build 
trust in public policies to facilitate di cult spending decisions in the future. There are real limits 
to how far a sense of inclusion and participation can be promoted, for example across a national 
education system or health service. Identiication with, for example, a particular school in a more 
participative or co-operative system may strengthen social divisions. These considerations may limit 
participation to the more restricted forms such as personal budgeting.
Pre-distribution is also highly attractive in terms of low direct public spending. It does not obviously 
involve extra spending and may well have longer-term beneits in reducing inequalities. The 
approach may encounter electoral and public opinion obstacles if it is seen to strengthen sectional 
interests. Again it may fail to strengthen inclusivity and solidarity between those in secure work and 
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This brief overview suggests that none of the proposed policies ofers a complete solution to 
the problems outlined earlier. Any progressive future is likely to rely on a combination, so that 
issues arise in reconciling conlicts between groups addressed by diferent approaches. The 
budgetary pressures require policies that constrain current spending. By the criterion of economic 
sustainability, social investment, deserving-centred, user engagement and pre-distribution policies 
seem attractive, because they are cheaper. Conversely, the social contribution approach seeks to 
ofer a way of presenting substantial generous and inclusive welfare so that it is electorally feasible. 
The “Left trilemma” relects a concern to demonstrate economic competence, a desire to gain public 
support and a commitment to progressive policies that is particularly intransigent when resources 
are limited. Policies which lead to savings are hard to reconcile with generosity and inclusiveness, 
which are hard to promote when public discourse is suspicious of the undeserving and lukewarm 
about taxing the better-of.
One possibility is to shift public discourse. The ive themes identiied earlier have remained powerful 
over time but do luctuate. In general they have moved against generosity and inclusiveness. This 
may indicate that the Right is more successful in leading public debate. The theme of social solidarity 
through a broad-based contribution system, reinforced with pre-distribution and social investment 
policies, may contribute to an attractive electoral platform. If contributory welfare involves increased 
spending this may limit its practicality, so that it is only practicable through gradual introduction 
over time. Provided that the systems are designed to foster inclusiveness and to minimise barriers 
between groups, the potential for leading public debate in a progressive direction is strong.
These policies must be embedded within an overall approach that fosters a return to growth 
through investment in infrastructure, production and social provision, and seeks higher taxation of 
the better-of. The resources available will be limited in the medium term, so that some cuts will be 
necessary to enable support for the most vulnerable. It is hard to see how generosity to pensioners 
can escape such constraints, because of the size of the programme.
This paper has set out the di culties any progressive social programme faces as a trilemma between 
economic viability, public acceptability and inclusiveness and generosity, which does not confront 
the Right. It shows that no suggested programme is wholly satisfactory on all counts and that 
there is a conlict at least in the short-term between policies that seem most likely to satisfy harsh 
spending pressures and an ungenerous public discourse, and those with the strongest potential to 
generate adequate and solidaristic welfare. This points to a broad and conjoint policy platform, and 
one which pays attention to ensuring that policies do not reinforce divisions and put obstacles in 
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